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We give an overview of the arguments of our book Imagination and Con-
vention, and explain how ideas from the book continue to inform our 
ongoing work. One theme is the challenge of fully accounting for the lin-
guistic rules that guide interpretation. By attending to principles of dis-
course coherence and the many aspects of meaning that are linguistical-
ly encoded but are not truth conditional in nature, we get a much more 
constrained picture of context sensitivity in language than philosophers 
have typically assumed. Another theme is the heterogeneous nature of 
interpretive processes, as illustrated by the distinctive interpretive pro-
fi le of metaphorical and poetic language. Such effects remind us that the 
suggestions and connotations of an utterance are often best explained in 
terms of the hearer’s experiential engagement with language, without 
appeal to propositional content that the speaker somehow signals either 
semantically or pragmatically.
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Imagination and Convention is a response to recent work in the cogni-
tive science of language—work which has deepened philosophers’ un-
derstanding both of the rules of language and of the processes of inter-
pretation by exploring in new detail the fi ne-grained distinctions that 
characterize the interpretation of utterances in context.
One tradition we engage with is that of formal semantics. While 
this research once focused on the truth-conditional meanings delivered 
by sentence-level grammar, in the tradition inaugurated by Montague 
(1974), recent work is much broader in scope. There are now a variety 
of formal theories of presupposition (e.g., van der Sandt 1992, Beaver 
2001), expressive meaning (e.g., Potts 2005), projective and not-at-issue 
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meaning (e.g., Tonhauser et al. 2013), and the interpretive links that 
connect multi-sentence discourse (e.g., Asher and Lascarides 2003). If 
such developments in formal semantics pan out, philosophers will need 
new conceptual tools to get clear on the relationship between gram-
mar, meaning, interpretation and communication. The received con-
structs that philosophers have used to frame intuitions about meaning, 
like Grice’s ‘what is said’, don’t capture what language encodes or how 
grammar shapes interpretation.
The second tradition we engage with is a psychological one, which 
explains how language users make sense of utterances and their speak-
ers. A common suggestion is that interpretations are often constructed 
creatively (Atlas 1989, 2005), for example, by taking words to signal 
new ‘ad hoc’ concepts (Carston 2002), by understanding phrases to be 
implicitly ‘enriched’ to more specifi c interpretations (Recanati 2004), 
and by loosening and transferring literal interpretations in light of 
inferences that matter in context (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 2008). 
Other researchers attribute interpretive effects to our empirical un-
derstanding of others’ choices (e.g., Pinker, Novak and Lee 2008), or 
to open-ended processes of imaginative engagement (e.g., Camp 2008). 
Again, these diverse models require us to refi ne philosophers’ received 
constructs for characterizing pragmatic inference, notably, of course, 
Grice’s notion of ‘conversational implicature’.
Synthesizing the perspectives of current research in semantics and 
pragmatics brings further challenges. Pragmatic theories have not yet 
come to grips with the heterogeneous nature of linguistic meaning as 
hypothesized in current formal semantics (see Simons et al. 2016 for 
some of the challenges involved). Conversely, the interpretive variabil-
ity exposed by pragmatic research is often understood to undermine 
the assumptions and framework of formal semantics (Atlas 2005, Tra-
vis 1997).
Imagination and Convention offers our take on this new intellectual 
landscape. In this précis, we give a brief overview of the philosophi-
cal positions that make our view distinctive and highlight some of the 
research directions that our new view affords. First, in §1, we draw 
some lessons about the linguistic rules that guide interpretation. Our 
contention is that context sensitivity is much more closely governed 
by linguistic rules than is often appreciated. However, these rules ap-
peal to more diverse principles than fi gure in traditional conceptions of 
semantics. Most importantly, we argue that the rules are sensitive to 
principles of discourse coherence, which we think of as linguistic con-
ventions that connect and structure sequences of linguistic expressions 
within, and across, sentences, and encode implicit inferential relation-
ships among their contents. In particular, the rules that link context-
sensitive expressions to their semantic values can only be stated in 
terms of the overall organization of coherent discourse.
Moreover, we believe that a broad characterization of linguistic 
structure and meaning is crucial for philosophers to correctly diagnose 
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the interplay between semantics and pragmatics. A particularly fruit-
ful but neglected case is intonation, which linguists model as a level of 
grammar that helps to signal the information structure of sentences 
in context, via the abstract meanings it encodes. As an illustration of 
the untapped implications of these principles, we close §1 with a brief 
survey of some developments since Imagination and Convention that 
we have pursued partly in collaboration with Una Stojnic (Lepore and 
Stone 2017a, Stojnic, Stone and Lepore 2013, Stojnic, Stone and Lepore 
2017), on semantic models of discourse coherence and context-depen-
dent meaning.
Next, in §2, we draw some lessons about the interpretive mecha-
nisms involved in appreciating the points that speakers have in us-
ing utterances. On our view, the insights that we gain from an utter-
ance often come from thinking about it in specifi c, creative ways. We 
briefl y sketch our account of metaphor as a quintessential example of 
such imaginative engagement. We see metaphor as a distinctive way of 
thinking of one thing as another—one whose effects can differ from per-
son to person and from occasion to occasion, and cannot be fully char-
acterized just in terms of propositional content. This broadly Davidso-
nian view, which we elaborated already in Lepore and Stone (2010), 
was in many ways the impetus for our critical take on implicature in 
Imagination and Convention. Interpreting a metaphorical utterance, 
on our view, requires the hearer to engage in this process of metaphori-
cal thinking, and to appreciate the insights this thinking engenders. 
In some cases, on our account, listeners can perhaps gain a deeper un-
derstanding into a speaker’s intentions in using a metaphor, as a side 
effect of their own metaphorical thinking. Note that this explanation 
fl ips the direction of explanation often suggested in pragmatic accounts 
of metaphor, such as Searle’s (1979) Gricean account, or Sperber and 
Wilson’s (2008) in terms of Relevance Theory, which attempt to show 
how general reasoning about a speaker might prompt a listener to pur-
sue associated or enriched interpretations which theorists might char-
acterize retrospectively as metaphorical. Poetry is another case that 
we have begun to explore (Lepore and Stone 2016) but which did not 
make it into Imagination and Convention. We close this section with a 
brief overview of our approach to poetic interpretation: on our view, it 
involves exploring the articulation of a linguistic expression for added 
insight into its meaning.
We close in §3 with some refl ections on the limits of knowledge of lan-
guage. Our view invites theorists to capture a wide range of conventional 
information within a broad overarching framework for linguistic mean-
ing: this includes not only the truth conditional content that is at issue in 
the use of a sentence, but also content that is encoded yet not at issue, for 
example, because it is marked as presupposed background, or because it 
is attached to a form as a matter of conventional implicature. However, 
a key part of our view is that the insights that the imagination prompts 
don’t have the status of linguistic meanings. Again, the consequences 
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of this suggestion are largely unexplored. For example, in Lepore and 
Stone (2017b), we explore the idea that such insights are nevertheless 
an integral part of speakers’ ear for the tonality of language—following 
up the infl uential suggestion of Frege that words can carry tone that 
does not contribute to the thoughts that sentences express.
1. The Interpretive Effects of Linguistic Rules
It often seems, intuitively, as though the interpretation of utterances is 
much stronger than the linguistic meanings of the expressions we use. 
In the book, we give (1–3) as illustrations of these effects.
(1) Can I have the French toast please?
(2) Oil prices doubled and demand for consumer goods plunged.
(3) Well, it looked red.
Example (1) is a question about ability that’s easily interpreted as 
making a request. Example (2) offers a pair of event descriptions; the 
speaker’s point seems to be that the events happened in succession and 
were perhaps even causally related. Example (3) describes the appear-
ance of an object—but we take the speaker also to suggest that things 
were not as they appeared.
On our view, these interpretations will normally count as cases of 
successful communication. The speaker has a particular interpretation 
in mind, and the listener succeeds in recovering that interpretation. 
The question is what knowledge enables the coordination between 
speaker and listener: it can be hard to see intuitively how closely, if 
at all, the interpretations we derive in these cases are associated with 
the linguistic forms the speaker uses. Part of the traditional appeal of 
pragmatic explanations, we think, is that they promise to explain how 
linguistic meaning gets enriched or amplifi ed here, without reference 
to unsuspected encoded meaning.
In Imagination and Convention, however, we argue that these in-
terpretations are encoded—despite appearances. To do so, we argue for 
a richer conception both of linguistic form and of linguistic meaning 
than philosophers have traditionally entertained.
To start, we suggest—following work of Asher and Lascarides 
(2003), Grosz and Sidner (1986), Hobbs (1979), Kehler (2001), and 
Webber et al. (2003)—that linguistic form crucially includes a level of 
discourse structure that gives an organization to linguistic expressions 
that can extend beyond an individual clause. In particular, discourse 
structure groups sentences together hierarchically into segments that 
are interpreted as a coherent whole, much as sentence syntax unites 
constituents together by structural and interpretive connections (Gro-
sz and Sidner 1986; Webber et al. 2003). Elements in discourse struc-
ture play specifi c roles in underwriting hearers’ interpretive inference. 
These interpretive connections are known as coherence relations, and 
they have a range of interpretive effects. For one thing, coherence rela-
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tions mark the commitments that arise when speakers use utterances 
indirectly to signal reactions to previous discourse; this means they 
make many kinds of alleged implicatures explicit. For another thing, 
coherence relations put particular discourse entities at the center of at-
tention, making them the most prominent values for resolving context-
dependent expressions. Because coherence relations give qualitatively 
different structures to discourse and dictate the formal dynamics of 
context, we argue that they must be represented in the logical form of 
discourse. Thus, we arrive at a picture where many alleged implica-
tures are actually a consequence of logical form. Although these fea-
tures of interpretation are still derived by the operation of abstract 
principles, the principles in question are linguistic rules rather than 
rational or psychological generalizations; they are ultimately continu-
ous with the abstract operations of formal compositional semantics.
We take (1) as a characteristic example of the role of coherence rela-
tions in underpinning apparently indirect interpretations. Imagination 
and Convention makes the case informally, but we offer an extended, 
formal treatment of cases like (1) in Lepore and Stone (2017a). This 
was the subject of our presentation at the 2015 workshop on linguistics 
and philosophy in Dubrovnik.
The challenge of (1) is to formalize the differences among declara-
tive, interrogative and imperative meanings. We model these differenc-
es, following Starr (2010), in terms of different roles information can 
play in moving conversation forward. Declaratives convey information; 
interrogatives raise questions; imperatives express preferences. Starr’s 
formalism gives a dynamic model of the state of a conversation that 
can distinguish among contributions of each of these kinds, and can 
also predict certain inferential relationships among them—thus, for 
example, conveying the right information can settle an open question. 
We also need to be able to combine different moves compositionally. 
Starr lets us combine two contributions into a single overarching move 
that starts by making the fi rst contribution and proceeds by making 
the second; he lets us make a contribution conditionally, depending on 
the results of some other one.
With these tools, we can represent (1) as ambiguous between two 
logical forms at the level of discourse. One, the simple question inter-
pretation, just raises a question: here, the question whether it is pos-
sible for the speaker to have the French toast. The second, the “indi-
rect” interpretation, raises that same question, then further expresses 
a conditional preference: here, the indirect interpretation raises the 
question whether it’s possible for the speaker to have the French toast, 
then expresses the preference that the speaker should have the French 
toast, assuming the answer is yes and it is possible. We show that such 
alternations in meaning are characteristic of a kind of polysemy Horn 
(1984) calls ‘autohyponymy’—often found in verb meanings—where 
words carry overlapping specifi c and general senses. We offer some 
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suggestions about capturing this polysemy, at an appropriate level of 
granularity, by a suitable linguistic rule.1
We think that representing these two interpretations of (1) in logi-
cal form shows the advantages of conventionalized coherence relations 
in giving a theory of interpretation. In particular, as Imagination and 
Convention considers in detail, there is ample evidence that the two 
interpretations are separately specifi ed by speakers’ knowledge of lan-
guage, and, moreover, that the conventional indirect interpretation is 
visible to other grammatical rules.
We explain (2), meanwhile, by a different set of resources in linguis-
tic meaning—the grammar of discourse reference. When we produce 
extended descriptions, narratives and explanations—including the one 
in (2)—grammar allows the interpretation of later elements to co-vary 
with the interpretations of earlier ones. Formally, this can be modeled 
by representing both elements with a common variable in logical form; 
however, to implement it correctly, we also need to set up an appropri-
ate logical system so that we can assign values to variables across an 
entire discourse (this suggestion goes back to Heim 1982 and Kamp 
1981—see Cumming 2008 for a broader defense and philosophical ex-
planation of the idea).
We can think of a grammar of discourse reference in terms of two 
components. One set of grammatical rules determines where variables 
occur (we call these ‘rules for anaphora’ in Imagination and Conven-
tion); the second set of grammatical rules says how the selection of 
a suitable variable is determined in context (we call these ‘rules for 
presupposition’ in Imagination and Convention). The idea of capturing 
dependent interpretations via variables that are subject to constraints 
is common to diverse approaches to formal semantics and pragmat-
ics, including not only van der Sandt (1992) but also the very different 
Hobbs et al. (1993).
We can illustrate this idea through an explanation of the understood 
temporal relationship in (2). Following Lascarides and Asher (1993), 
Partee (1973) and Webber (1988), we assume that the tense of past 
tense English verbs can trigger a dependent temporal interpretation. 
That is, a past tense verb describes an event or state as located within a 
specifi c temporal interval, its reference time. In (2), then, ‘plunged’ has 
a meaning similar in content to ‘then plunged’. The reference interval 
is taken from context in a way that gives it an interpretation that can 
depend on previous discourse. In (2), the reference time for ‘plunged’ is 
derived from the event time for ‘doubled’. Importantly, these intervals 
progress in a discourse as a function of the coherence relations that 
1 The idea is to use lexical rules—defaults that apply across general classes of 
words, with exceptions—to transform basic meanings into related, derived meanings. 
Such rules are needed quite independently, for example, to stipulate that the names 
of animals are also used as the names of meat, with a few marked exceptions 
including ‘beef’ and ‘pork’. This strategy for capturing conventional indirect speech 
acts was originally proposed by Asher and Lascarides (2001).
 E. Lepore, M. Stone, Précis of Imagination and Convention 135
implicitly connect the discourse together: in Narrative discourse, for 
example, event verbs update the most prominent reference interval to 
a period immediately after the event took place, when its consequences 
continued to hold. That’s what happens in (2). Thus, overall, we explain 
the interpretation of (2), that the plunge follows the doubling, because 
we represent the meaning of the form ‘plunged’ (in particular, its tense 
and aspect) as locating that event within a reference interval after the 
doubling, a reference interval that is made prominent by the preceding 
use of the form ‘doubled’ as part of an extended discourse organized by 
the Narration relation.
Researchers have developed a range of different formal models of 
presupposition and anaphora. Since completing the book, we have been 
exploring a particularly strict conception of the rules for context de-
pendence, in our collaborative work with Una Stojnic (Stojnic, Stone 
and Lepore 2017). Our proposal is that the state of the discourse com-
pletely determines which variable should be used to interpret a de-
pendent, context-sensitive element. For example, just as ‘I’ picks out a 
distinguished semantic value in any context—namely, the speaker of 
the utterance—just so, ‘he’ picks out a distinguished semantic value—a 
variable that has been established by discourse coherence as the rep-
resentation of the most prominent male with respect to the place of the 
current clause within the organization of discourse.
This approach depends on a synthesis of our approaches to discourse 
coherence and discourse reference. Many researchers have noticed that 
when the interpretation of pronouns and other anaphoric elements 
seems to be ambiguous, there are also corresponding ambiguities in 
the overall coherence of discourse (see Kehler et al. 2008 for review). 
Take (4), originally studied by Smyth (1994) and discussed extensively 
by Kehler et al. (2008).
(4) Phil tickled Stanley and Liz poked him.
The speaker here might mean Phil by ‘him’, but in this case the speaker 
is describing Liz’s action as a sequel to, and perhaps even as a retalia-
tion for, Phil’s tickling. Alternatively, the speaker might mean Stanley 
by ‘him’, but in this case the speaker’s point is to draw an analogy 
between Phil’s and Liz’s attacks on Stanley; this interpretation doesn’t 
seem to involve any commitments about whether the poking preceded, 
followed or was simultaneous with the tickling. In short, the discourse 
in (4) is organized either via a kind of Narration or via a kind of Resem-
blance relation, and this relationship gives us the value of the pronoun.
In Stojnic, Stone and Lepore (2017), we offer a formalization of this 
idea that makes precise the effects that coherence relations have on the 
prominence of candidate interpretations, and makes good on the intui-
tive idea that pronouns are interpreted simply by retrieving the most 
prominent candidate interpretation in context. In her (2016a), Stojnic 
develops an analogous approach to the context dependence of modal 
vocabulary, and in her (2016b) she even proposes to handle quanti-
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fi er domain restriction and incomplete defi nite descriptions with these 
techniques.
The last of our motivating examples, (3), is a reminder that natural 
language utterances generally have a more complex linguistic structure 
than orthography alone captures. Nevertheless, all of the grammatical 
components of an utterance can carry encoded meanings. What matters 
for (3) is intonation. When we imagine (3) used, as Kripke (1978) does, 
to challenge a previous speaker’s contention that the handkerchief in 
a magic act was not red, we tend to imagine the utterance delivered in 
a particular way. The speaker will emphasize ‘looked’ rather than ‘it’ 
or ‘red’; the speaker will perform the utterance with a particular tune 
(or ‘pitch contour’) with a rise on ‘looked’, followed by a fall, so that 
‘red’ comes with a rise of its own at the end. These aspects of the per-
formance of the utterance are meaningful—they fi gure in the English 
grammar of information structure, which characterizes the different 
roles of linguistic material in making contributions to discourse.
We give a comprehensive survey of information structure in the 
book, focusing on intonation and drawing particularly on the work of 
Steedman (2000). But you can already explain the distinctive inter-
pretation of (3) with reference to Ward and Hirschberg’s (1985) theory 
of the rise-fall-rise contour. They suggest that this tune is associated 
with limited agreement in discourse, while the placement of accents 
signals a point of contrast relevant to that limited agreement. In other 
words, the intonation of (3) encodes the fact that the speaker cannot 
completely agree with the prior suggestion that the handkerchief was 
red: although the handkerchief did look red, there can be a contrast be-
tween how something looks and how something actually is. This mean-
ing is signaled by the grammar of (3), not derived by implicature. In-
formation structure in its full generality, we suggest, has far-reaching 
consequences for many other cases of alleged implicature as well.
In hindsight, we would draw a broader message from the discussion 
of information structure and intonation in Imagination and Conven-
tion. A full treatment of the logical form of utterances may have to in-
corporate the contributions of a wider range of communicative actions 
than philosophers of language typically consider. Take deictic gestures, 
for example, which normally accompany demonstrative noun phrases 
(like ‘this’ or ‘that’ in English). The received view from Kaplan (1989) 
is that gestures are nonlinguistic cues that let a speaker provide evi-
dence about the referent they intend. However, many cognitive scien-
tists—including McNeill (1992) and Kendon (2004)—see gesture and 
language as part of a single, integrated system for making our ideas 
public. That suggests that we can and should represent the interpreta-
tion of speech and gesture in a single formalism (Lascarides and Stone 
2009), and even derive the interpretation of speech and gesture compo-
sitionally (Alahverdzhieva and Lascarides 2011, Giorgolo 2010).
When we adopt such theories, we may be led to signifi cant depar-
tures from traditional views of context sensitivity in philosophy. For 
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example, in Stojnic, Stone and Lepore (2013), we provide a formalism 
where even the demonstratives ‘this’ and ‘that’ turn out to get their val-
ues directly as a function of the context—just like pure indexicals. The 
tools we use are parallel to those in Stojnic, Stone and Lepore (2017). 
We give a grammatical analysis of pointing gestures; their meanings 
update the context in which a subsequent demonstrative is interpreted 
by putting particular entities and situations at the center of attention. 
In the resulting context, the demonstrative automatically gets its cor-
rect, context-dependent semantic value.
In sum, we encourage readers to regard the case studies of discourse 
coherence anaphora and presupposition, and information structure 
that we consider in Imagination and Convention—as exhibited in the 
interpretations of (1–3)—merely as an indication of the diversity and 
importance of linguistic semantics in guiding utterance understanding. 
We think many more rules remain to be uncovered, and correspond-
ingly, that there is much more to say about the linguistic knowledge 
that underpins interpretation. We encourage students of language to 
appreciate the ways in which appeals to Gricean reasoning—the idea 
that the audience simply constructs whatever interpretation makes 
sense, purely by intuition and common sense—forecloses inquiry that 
could expose and characterize such knowledge. The effect, we think, is 
both tempting and insidious.
We know that utterances make sense, and accordingly, that we can 
resolve ambiguities in part by considering what we know about the 
speaker. As Blackstone (1765) says, in describing the considerations of 
jurisprudence that should go into the interpretation of the language of 
a statute:
The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, 
is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs 
the most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the 
context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and 
reason of the law. (Blackstone 1765: I, Introduction, §2)
When we read the alleged ‘derivations’ of Gricean pragmatics, we fi nd 
they often hint, retrospectively, at plausible reasons why interpreters 
might prefer an attested reading from other candidate interpretations. 
In these informal accounts of disambiguation, however, Grice tends 
simply to proffer the correct interpretation without explanation, so it’s 
easy to lose track of the principles that derive and license the possible 
interpretations in the fi rst place. Our experience is that—at least when 
utterances have a specifi c, clear interpretation—the relevant princi-
ples are always principles of grammar.
2. Varieties of Interpretive Reasoning
A different line of argument in Imagination and Convention, mean-
while, makes the case that researchers have often been too quick to 
distill the points that speakers make with utterances, and the insights 
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that hearers derive from them, in terms of propositional content. On 
our view, audiences approach utterances through diverse kinds of 
imaginative engagement, which, we think, philosophers and cognitive 
scientists must describe in diverse and generally non-propositional 
terms.
We give a number of examples of such effects in the book. Perhaps 
the deepest and most persuasive is the case of metaphor. The discours-
es that best illustrate our thesis are extended, novel metaphors that 
call for active engagement on the part of the audience. The example we 
like to cite is (5).
(5) Love is a snowmobile, racing across the tundra. It fl ips over, 
pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come. (Matt 
Groening, given as (1) in Lepore and Stone (2010) and as (177) 
in Imagination and Convention.)
Many discussions—particularly those in the tradition of Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980)—claim that semantics is rife with metaphor. They 
posit active spatial metaphors at work in the grammar of change (e.g., 
‘the light went from green to yellow’), the grammar of mental states 
(e.g., ‘I can’t get that idea out of my mind’), etc. This contrasts with a 
more conservative view in formal semantics: that such locutions really 
involve abstract meanings that apply across semantic domains (see 
Hobbs 2011). Focusing on examples like (5) enables us to sidestep this 
controversy about the pervasiveness of metaphor.
Similarly, it’s clear that many word senses have metaphorical ori-
gins that audiences need not activate—and usually do not activate—as 
part of understanding them (Glucksberg 2001). For example, expe-
rienced speakers probably understand ‘family tree’ directly in terms 
of their concepts of genealogy, ‘syntax tree’ directly in terms of their 
concepts of grammatical derivation, or ‘binary tree’ directly in terms 
of their knowledge of algorithms and data structures, and not by en-
tertaining a biological metaphor. Such cases, of course, are generally 
described as ‘dead metaphors’. There may be philosophically interest-
ing things to say about dead metaphors.2 However, our arguments in 
Imagination and Convention focus just on (5) and other cases where 
metaphor is used productively and creatively. We think there’s no way 
to account for their interpretation by postulating conventional seman-
tics or by Gricean pragmatics that somehow delivers a ‘metaphorical 
meaning’. We describe what’s happening in these cases in a different 
way.
We start from the suggestion—originally due to Black (1955) but 
recently defended in detail by Camp (2003, 2008, 2009)—that appreci-
ating a metaphor involves a distinctive kind of imaginative effort. One 
2 For example, in Lepore and Stone (2017b) we consider the possibility that one 
aspect of the connotation and Fregean tonality of words arises from the ability of 
a perceptive reader or listener to redeploy and draw insights from metaphors that 
other speakers might ignore as dead or dying.
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key component of this effort is perspective taking: thinking of one thing 
as another. More precisely, metaphorical perspective taking requires 
an audience to construct a wide-ranging correspondence between enti-
ties in a source domain and entities in a target domain. Thus, for ‘love 
is a snowmobile’, we must not only imagine love as a snowmobile, but 
see the lovers as passengers, see the motion and mishaps of the vehicle 
as placeholders for the events that unfold in the course of a typical rela-
tionship, and—most importantly—appreciate the similarity in feeling 
between the lovers’ experience of their affair and the snowmobile pas-
sengers’ experience of their ride.
Moreover, as Camp (2008) describes it, metaphorical perspective 
taking involves a specifi c direction of fi t. The point of a metaphor is 
not just to blend ideas together, or to remap the world in pretense: we 
don’t interpret (5) just by imagining or pretending that lovers are rid-
ing a snowmobile. Instead, we draw on our knowledge of snowmobiles, 
selectively and judiciously, to fi nd features that help us to appreciate 
corresponding aspects of the experience of love.
Once we characterize the workings of metaphor this way, we are led 
to a position similar to Davidson’s (1978) about the philosophical status 
of metaphorical interpretation. Metaphor is not a case of Gricean rea-
soning: the insights of metaphor come not from working out what the 
speaker must have intended, but from engaging metaphorically with 
the text itself. Metaphorical insights are a product of the audience’s 
private psychology in confrontation with challenging imagery. (David-
son memorably—though in our view not entirely accurately—compares 
the effects of a metaphor to those of a dream or even those of a bump 
on the head!)
The insights of metaphor need not even be propositional in nature. 
As with Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit fi gure, which viewers can see as 
one thing or as another, what matters in metaphor is the dynamics of 
experience—such factors as attention, memory and inference, as they 
are deployed in real time to organize and explain things around us. To 
try to boil this active process down to some specifi c information that the 
speaker of a metaphor intends to convey and that the audience aims 
to reconstruct is to miss what’s really going on in this kind of language 
use.
In the book, we describe other literary effects in similar terms. We 
describe sarcasm as an invitation to appreciate an utterance framed in 
familiar terms as an inversion of what circumstances actually demand. 
We describe irony as an invitation to derive insights from engaging 
with the imagined speaker of an utterance exhibited in pretense. We 
describe humor as the appreciation of the potential of an utterance si-
multaneously to sustain two perspectives with opposed affective im-
port. We describe hinting as an invitation for the hearer to formulate 
her own reactions to the theme of the utterance—perhaps guided by 
the associations of apparently incongruous or irrelevant detail.
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We emphasize that these forms of imaginative engagement are nei-
ther mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. In fact, we have followed up 
this part of the book (Lepore and Stone 2016) by using the framework 
to explicate one particular ingredient in the interpretation of poetry.
Poets, of course, recruit all the expressive resources at their dis-
posal. We often fi nd that metaphorical language, in particular, can be 
particularly poetic. But, we suggest, something special happens when 
interpreters approach the articulation of language as poetry—regard-
less of the semantic content it has or the other components of their 
imaginative engagement with it.
In a poem, articulation itself is a meaningful part of the experi-
ence of understanding. The reader of poetry can attend to the sound, 
rhythm, lineation and even typography of the work, as a prompt to 
better understand it and to draw richer insights into the experience it 
affords. These cues can add sensual qualities that heighten the imag-
ery of a poem, call attention to formal relationships within the poem 
that take on a corresponding importance, or help to attune the reader 
to the dynamic consciousness behind the poem, giving voice to a dis-
tinctive fl ow of perception, emotion and judgment. In describing poetic 
interpretation this way, we draw on a range of antecedents—from Pope 
(1711) through the New Critics of the mid 1900s (e.g., Brooks 1947) up 
to present-day scholars such as Longenbach (2008). All of these au-
thors highlight similar aspects of what can happen when an audience 
appreciates a poem. However, critics have often been too ready to blur 
together the appreciation of a poem and its meaning. We maintain that 
poetic language retains its ordinary meanings—we think that this con-
clusion is philosophically inescapable. Nevertheless, we can appeal to 
the particular imaginative practice poetic language recruits in order 
to talk about the special effects of poetic language. In doing so, we dis-
cover that poetry involves a form of engagement which is distinct not 
only from the forensic project of reconstructing a speaker’s communi-
cative intentions, but also from the many other imaginative practices 
that speakers can invite that we already survey in Imagination and 
Convention.
Here, then, as in our account of the conventions of grammar, we 
hope that research is just beginning: there’s room to address new kinds 
of data and to develop correspondingly refi ned accounts of the strate-
gies that our psychology and culture gives us for enriching the experi-
ence of making sense of language.
3. Theorizing Semantics and Pragmatics
Theories of meaning have represented one of the most vital contribu-
tions of philosophy to cognitive science. Clear thinking and good ex-
amples have been instrumental in helping researchers to get clear on 
the ways that speakers exploit knowledge of language, knowledge of 
other people, and common sense in order to get their ideas across to 
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one another and to carry out joint projects together. The phenomena 
are so challenging precisely because such wide-ranging knowledge is 
implicated in every episode of communication.
We think the contemporary debate about the meanings of slurs is 
indicative of the diffi culty that is involved (Lepore and Stone 2017b). 
As we noted in our introduction here, and survey in Imagination and 
Convention, the results of formal semantics offer many ways to asso-
ciate words with evaluative content, including at-issue content, pre-
supposed content, projective and not-at issue content, and expressive 
contents. These resources can be crucial for getting clear on the mean-
ings of some words. But there are also good reasons not to regard all 
differences of nuance and tone as differences in conventional mean-
ing. Words can still invite metaphorical thinking and other kinds of 
perspective taking, they can still prompt us to think of others who 
have used them, and they are subject to prohibitions and other social 
constraints that—regardless of how the taboos arise—endow their use 
with a special charge. Especially for problematic terms such as slurs, 
only a close look at their interpretive profi le—in light of the full range 
of theoretical possibilities—can reveal what amounts to encoded mean-
ing, as distinct from mere suggestions and connotations.
Encoded meaning itself is just the starting point for much of our 
interactions with one another. People use language intentionally, and 
people work hard to understand one another as people—not just to un-
derstand the language they use. Scientifi cally, there’s ample evidence 
that intention recognition shapes the choices that interlocutors make in 
dialogue (Grosz and Sidner 1986), that it helps them avoid and recover 
from failures in communication (Brennan 2005), and that it’s crucial 
for enabling infants to learn language in the fi rst place (Bloom 2000).
Nothing we say undermines these obvious realities—nor do they 
undermine anything we say. The book offers an extended discussion of 
the cognitive architecture of collaborative language use in support of 
this claim. But the general lines of argument will be familiar; other se-
mantic minimalists, such as Borg (2004), have presented similar lines 
of thinking.
This précis has emphasized the polemical side of our book and its 
implications. But we also wrote the book as a survey of the important 
theories, data and arguments that are relevant to mapping the rela-
tionships between semantics and pragmatics. We expect that few, if 
any, readers of the book will agree with us in all its particulars. But 
we are optimistic that readers will come away from our book with a 
feeling for how broad the phenomena are that bear on the interface of 
semantics and pragmatics, a deeper appreciation for the kinds of facts 
that seem to distinguish most strongly among the theoretical alterna-
tives, and a road map to the open problems where future work is likely 
to bring challenges that all current theories must respond to. We hope 
you agree with us at least that the papers in this special issue illustrate 
these possibilities!
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